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III. Judicial Developments
A. Trusts
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1. Capacity to Establish Domicile
2. Estate-Related Torts
3. Will Contests
4. Interpretation of Wills
5. Instructions to Personal Representative
6. Guardians and Conservators
I. Introduction
The most significant development in 1969 in the area of
trusts and estates was the codification of the law regarding
powers of appointmene Other legislation subjects irrevocable inter vivos trusts to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. 2
In the area of judicial developments, there were two cases
of first impression. Estate of Pernas,3 dealt with the allocation as to principal or income of gains distributed from mutual
funds. The other, Estate of Phillips,4 concerned the admission to probate of a will executed by a Californian who had
been adjudicated an incompetent in Illinois prior to his coming to California.
II. Statutory Developments

A. Powers of Appointment
The Powers of Appointment Act, 5 which becomes operative
on July 1, 1970, is the result of recommendations by the California Law Revision Commission,6 based on a study1 by Professor Richard R.B. Powell. s
1. Stats. 1969, Chs. 155 and 468.
2. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1172.
3. 268 Cal. App.2d 275, 74 Cal. Rptr.
8 (1968).
4. 269 Cal. App. 2d 656, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 301 (1969).
5. Civ. Code §§ 1380.1-1392.1.
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6. The commission was directed by
Resolution Chapter 130 of the Statutes
of 1965 to make a study relating to
powers of appointment.
7. Research Study: Powers of Appointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J.
1281 (1968).
8. Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law.
CAL LAW 1970
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Professor Powell proposed the application of the common
law pursuant to Estate of Sloan,9 but with statutory specification of some items. In his study, Professor Powell describes
his position:
"There is no need to include in the statute a coverage of
all the points possibly litigable concerning powers of appointment. The bar and the courts will be greatly
helped, and the public interest will be served, by a statute
which does spell out the "common law of California,"
on the core points as to which litigation can fairly be
anticipated. This will eliminate the need for expensive
research into the decisions of England and of our sister
states as to the content of the common law on powers.
At present the Restatement of Property can be regarded
as probably a fair presentation of the common law, but
a careful lawyer will feel compelled to dig out the decisions and to weigh their conflicting ideas. So also will
the careful judge. A declaratory statute will greatly
minimize this wasteful process for both the bar and the
bench."lo
As a result of the Powell study, and recommendations by
the Law Revision Commission, the important portions of the
common law on powers were codified in the California Civil
Code. l1 California now becomes the fourth state12 in the past
six years to codify the common law on powers.
The new Civil Code sections include some departures from
the common law, and existing California law, that warrant
additional discussion. Four specific areas of departure, suggested by both Professor Powell and the Law Revision Commission, were adopted by the legislature.
9. 7 Cal. App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007
(1935). Estate of Sloan held the common law of powers of appointment to be
in effect in California unless modified
by statute. This included the earlier
common-law preference for nonexclusive powers that was directly contrary
to the "modern" common-law preference.
CAL LAW 1970
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10. Research Study: Powers of Appointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J.
1281 at 1293 (1968).
11. Civ. Code §§ 1380.1-1392.1.

12. The three recent enactments were
in New York (1964), Wisconsin (1965),
and Michigan (1967).
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1. Definition of General Power
The federal and state death tax statutes have long been
guides to attorneys in defining the terms general and special
powers. These definitions differ from the common law. In
an effort to adopt a definition consistent with prevailing views,
section 1381.2 departs from the common law and uses
definitions set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,13
and the California Revenue and Taxation Code. 14 A similar
provision was adopted by New York, Wisconsin, and Michigan in their recent statute revisions.
2. Exclusive v. Nonexclusive Powers
The modern common-law preference for donees with special
powers is to allow them to choose freely among the permissible appointees unless the donor states a contrary intent.
This is known as an "exclusive" power in the donee. Estate
of Sloan16 held that California's preference is for a "nonexclusive" power in the donee of a special power. This meant that
the donee had to give something to each permissible appointee,
whether or not this was the intention of the donor.
Section 1387.3 adopts the modern preference of exclusive
powers, but allows the donor to specify a minimum or maximum to one or more appointees. This reverses the holding of
Sloan. 16

3. Creditors' Rights
Under the common law, creditors of a donee of a general
power had limited rights. It was presumed that the donee had
no rights of ownership and that the appointee took directly
from the donor. 17 Thus, it was difficult for a creditor to reach
13. I.R.C. 1954 § 2091(b)(1).
14. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13692
(1965).
15. 7 Cal. App.2d - , 46 P.2d 1007
(1935).
16. 7 Cal. App.2d - , 46 P.2d 1007
(1955). See also Research Study: Pow-
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ers of Appointment in California, 19
Hast. L.J. 1281 at 1296 (1968).
17. Research Study: Powers of Appointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J.
1281 at 1294 (1968).
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appointive assets. Today, a donee with a general power of
appointment, whether exercised or not, has the equivalent of
a fee simple over the appointive assets because of Section 2041
of the Internal Revenue Code. 1s It seems inequitable to allow
such property to be free from the claims of creditors of the
donee. To remedy this, a portion of the new statute19 states
that when the donee's other property is inadequate to satisfy
the claims of creditors, property subject to a general power
may be reached. This statute corresponds with ones recently
enacted in New York (1964), Wisconsin (1965), and Michigan (1967) .20
4. Exercise of Powers by the Residuary Clause of
Donee's Will
The rule of California Probate Code section 125 1 is the exact
opposite of the common-law rule. 2 Professor Powell recommended that this section be revised or eliminated in an effort
to abrogate the harsh results that occurred in Estate of Carter. 3
In Carter, the testator-donee of a general testamentary power
did not exercise the power. There was very convincing evidence, apart from the will, that the donee did not intend to
exercise the power. However, the Supreme Court of California interpreted Probate Code section 125 to mean
that a residuary clause in a will exercises a general power
unless there is language contained within the will to indicate
a contrary intent, or the donor has required the donee to
make specific reference to the power in the will. 4
18. Section 2041(b)(I) defines a "general power of appointment" as meaning
a power that is exercisable in favor of
the decedent, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate with certain stated exceptions.
19. Civ. Code § 1390.3.
20. Research Study: Powers of Appointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J.
1281 at 1295 (1968).
1. "A devise or bequest of all the
testator's real or personal property, in
express terms, or in any other terms de-
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noting his intent to dispose of all his
real or personal property, passes all the
real or personal property which he was
entitled to dispose of by will at the
time of his death, including property
embraced in a power to devise." Stats
1931, Ch. 2 § 1, p. 594, § 125.
2. Research Study: Powers of Appointment in California, 19 Hast. L.J.
1281 at 1291 (1968).
3. 47 Cal.2d 200, 302 P.2d 301
(1956.)
4. 47 Cal.2d 200, 204-205, 302 P.2d
301, 304.
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The exercise of a power by a residuary clause is now covered
by Civil Code section 1386.2. This section will allow introduction of evidence apart from the will to prove the donee's
intent. Amendments to Probate Code sections 125 and 126
now make these sections inoperative with respect to powers
of appointment. 6
B. Trusts

A new act, relating to the administration of inter vivos
trusts, will become operative on November 1, 1970. 6 The act
will vest the Superior Court with jurisdiction over irrevocable
inter vivos trusts if the trust instrument specifically so provides, or if the trustee petitions the Court to assume jurisdicdiction of all or part of the trust under the act. It must be
noted, however, that a trust instrument may prohibit the
application of the act to all or a part of the trust.
Two new code sections were added in 1969, relating to
community property in trust. 7 Civil Code section 5113.5,8
states that when a husband and wife transfer community property into certain revocable trusts, their respective interests
shall remain community property, unless the trust expressly
provides otherwise. However, when the trust instrument provides a means of distribution in the event of death, new Probate Code section 204 provides that the provisions of the
trust must prevail, notwithstanding the spouses' rights under
Probate Code sections 201, 202 and 203.
C. Administration of Estates

The work of executors and administrators may be lessened
due to the following code changes:
1. Where the decedent left an undivided interest in property, the executor or administrator of an estate is now allowed,
5. Probate Code §§ 125 and 126
were amended as part of the Powers of
Appointment Act to specifically exempt
them from applying to powers of appointment.
6. Probate Code §§ 1137-1137.14.
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7. Civ. Code § 5113.5 and Probate
Code § 204. For a further discussion,
see Gouff, Community Property and
Family Law.
8. Former Civ. Code § 164.8.
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pursuant to Probate Code section 575, to maintain an action
for partition without first obtaining court authority.
2. When it is shown to be in the best interest of an estate
to exchange any property of the estate, the court may allow
such an exchange after the requirements under section 1200
have been met. This procedure, under section 860 of the
Probate Code, has been amended to allow the court to shorten
the notice period or dispense with it completely when the exchange of stocks, bonds, or other securities, as defined in section 771, is for different stocks, bonds, or securities.
3. There are two instances under Probate Code section
842, when estate property may be leased for a period of more
than ten years: a lease for the purpose of production of
minerals, oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances, and a lease
for the growing of asparagus. Section 842.1 was added in
1969, to allow the court to authorize the giving of a lease for
over ten years on any estate property if it is agreeable with all
persons interested in the estate; however, if any interested
person objects, the court shall not make the order.
4. In 1969, section 760.5 was added to the Probate Code,
to allow an executor or administrator to contract with an auctioneer to secure purchasers for any tangible personal property
of an estate. Title to the property will pass upon receipt
of the purchase price and delivery to the buyer, but the personal representative will be liable for the actual value until
confirmation by the court.
D. Guardians
By amendment of section 1402 of the Probate Code,9 it is
now possible for any person, not just parents, to appoint by
will a guardian for the estate that they are leaving to a minor.
This will allow the testator to choose a guardian to handle the
9. Stats. 1969, Ch. 563, p. 231. "A
parent may appoint a guardian by will
or by deed for the property of any child
of such parent, living or likely to be
born, which such child may take from
such parent by will or succession, and
CAL LAW 1970
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any person may in a will appoint a
guardian for the property of any minor,
living or likely to be born, which such
minor may take from such person by
such will."
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particular property whom he feels will have the best interest of
the minor in mind.
E. Time Periods

A reduction in the time required to probate an estate appears the goal of the legislature, which has reduced many timeperiod requirements of the Probate Code.
1. A person eligible to contest a will after probate must do
so within 4 months after such probate, rather than the 6
months previously allowed, according to revisions in Probate
Code sections 380 and 384.
2. In keeping with last year's shortening of the time for
creditors to file claims, in 1969 section 702 was similarly
changed to reduce from 6 months to 4 months the time creditors have to file claims because of a delayed filing of affidavit
of publication.
3. When 2 months have elapsed after the first pUblication
of notice to creditors, it is now possible under section 1000,
to petition for preliminary distribution, and, under section
1080, to file a petition to determine heirship. This is a change
from 3 months and 4 months, respectively.
III. Judicial Developments

A. Trusts
Elvira Pernas, the testator in Estate of Pernas,10 died in
1953, leaving a will that created a testamentary trust. The
trust named William A. Evans as a life beneficiary, with the
remainder to three charitable organizations, but made no indication of the testatrix's intent as to the allocation between
principal and income. The principal assets of the trust were
shares of corporations commonly known as mutual funds.
During a 12-year period, the trustee became entitled to receive either cash or additional shares as distribution of capital

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/12
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Rptr. 8 (1968).
376

CAL LAW 1970

8

Hill: Trusts and Estates

Trusts and Estates

gains realized by the fund. In each instance, the trustee
chose to receive shares rather than cash. These shares were
always allocated to the principal of the trust.
On the filing of an accounting reflecting the trustee's allocation, the life beneficiary objected. The remaindermen appealed from the trial court's order that the capital gains distribution should have been allocated to income and disbursed
to the life beneficiary.
The decision in the Pernas case rests on an interpretation
of the Principal and Income Act prior to its modification by
the legislature in 1967. The present statute provides:
"Distributions made from ordinary income by a regulated
investment company or by a trust qualifying and electing
to be taxed under federal law as a real estate investment
trust are income. All other distributions made by the
company or trust, including distributions from capital
gains, depreciations, or depletion, whether in the form of
cash or an option to take new stock or cash or an option
to purchase additional shares, are principal."ll
The Code also provides that in all other cases where the
trustee has the option of receiving a dividend in either cash or
shares, the dividend shall be considered as cash and deemed
income, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee. Excepted are distributions from regulated-investment companies
or real estate investment trusts. Prior to this 1967 change in
the statute, the code provided:
"Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a
dividend either in cash or in the shares of the declaring
corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend
and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by
the trustee."12
The Court held that the 1967 amendment was expressly
intended to change the law with respect to the allocation of
distributions from mutual funds. Therefore, distributions of
11. Civ. Code § 730.06(c).
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Amendment, Stats. 1967, Ch. 726.
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capital gains, whether in cash or shares, prior to 1967 were
deemed to be income, and the trial court's opinion was affirmed.
Estate of Talbot/ 3 a subsequent case also involving allocation of principal and income, involved stock in General Motors
and Du Pont, rather than in an investment company. In Talbot, the trust res included shares of stock in E.!. du Pont de
Nemours, Inc. The du Pont Corporation owned a large block
of shares in General Motors Corporation. As a result of
antitrust litigation, the United States Government was able
to compel du Pont to distribute all of its General Motors
stock to its shareholders.
The trustee of the Talbot trust received 544 shares of General Motors stock by virtue of its ownership of du Pont shares.
The trustee chose to treat the General Motors stock as principal rather than income available for a life tenant. In the
absence of a clear expression of intent on the part of the testator creating the trust, the Court was required to determine
whether the General Motors shares should be treated as principal or income.
Inasmuch as the trust had been created in 1931, and the
principal and income statute14 is applicable only to trusts
established after 1941, the statute had no application to this
case. The Court applied the Pennsylvania rule,15 which was
the law in California at the time of the creation of the Talbot
trust. The Court also found persuasive authority in the Restatemene s for the proposition that an involuntary corporate

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/12

13. 269 Cal. App.2d 526, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 920 (1969).
14. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.02, was repealed by Cal. Stats. 1967, Ch. 1508 § 1,
p. 3576, operative July 1, 1968. See
§ 730.15.
15. The Pennsylvania rule disregards
the character of that received, such as
cash dividend, stock dividend, or distribution of assets, and considers, rather,
the period of time during which the
dividend or distribution was earned by
the corporation. That which is found
378

to be earned only before the commencement of a life estate is allocated to the
corpus of the trust, while earnings wholly earned after a life estate commenced
is allocated entirely to income. In the
event that the earnings do not fall clearly into either category but are from
both periods of time, a proper apportionment is made between principal and
income.
16. "Where a corporation is directed
by public authority to cease to hold
shares of a subsidiary corporation, and
CAL LAW 1970
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distribution is a distribution of principal rather than income,
and noted that the California principal and income statute,17
while inapplicable, provides that distribution made pursuant to
a court decree belong to principal rather than income. Finally, the Court pointed out that the relative status of the life
tenant and the remaindermen have remained unchanged inasmuch as the life tenant will continue to receive the income,
although a portion of the dividends received in the trust will
now flow from the General Motors Corporation rather than
the Du Pont Corporation. Based on the foregoing, the Court
held that the shares of General Motors Corporation that were
distributed were a portion of the principal and were not allocable to income.
B. Estates

1. Capacity to Establish Domicile
In Estate of Phillips,18 the Court held that an adjudicated
incompetent may change his legal domicile if he has sufficient
mental capacity to select and adopt a new one. Declared incompetent in 1964 in Illinois, the decedent subsequently made
two trips to California; the first a visit of one month, the latter
for eleven months, terminated by his death. A few weeks
prior to his death, he executed a will in which he stated, "I
have now changed my domicile and residence to the State
of California." That will was offered for probate by the
named executor. Objections were filed by the Illinois appointed conservator of the person and estate of the decedent.
The basis for objection was the lack of capacity of an incompetent to change his place of residence. The Court noted
that residence, as used in the appropriate Probate Code section,19 is synonymous with domicile. The Court, in its opinion, uses the two terms interchangeably.
it distributes such shares among its
share holders, such distribution may be
held to be in the nature of a partial
liquidation and allocable to principal."
Restatement, Trusts, 2d, § 236 (E).
CAL LAW 1970
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18.
Rptr.
19.

Cal. Civ. Code § 730.06(b)(3).
269 Cal. App.2d 656, 75 Cal.
301 (1969).
Probate Code § 301.
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The acquisition of a new domicile, as defined by the Court,
requires a physical change of residence, accompanied by an
intent to make such change permanent or indefinite. In affirming the trial court decision to admit the will to probate,
the Court of Appeal relied on the Restatement of Conflicts.20
While this situation has not previously arisen in California,
the majority view from other jurisdictions, as expressed in the
Restatement, is as follows:
"A person who is mentally deficient or of unsound mind
can acquire a domicile as if he had normal mental capacity if he is able to choose a home.,,1
The Court also relied on the analogous law in California holding that the fact of adjudication of incompetency does not
warrant a finding of lack of testamentary capacity without
other evidence. The court held:
"
. If an incompetent has the capacity to make a
valid will under certain circumstances, he may also have
the capacity to decide the place of his domicile if he is
otherwise mentally alert and capable of choosing this
home.,,2

2. Estate-Related Torts

In MacDonald v. Joslyn,3 the decedent left an estate in excess of $10,000,000. His eldest son requested that the hearing
on the petition for probate of the will be postponed for two
months. On the arrival of the new date for the hearing, the
son filed a contest of the will on the grounds of fraud and undue influence. Six months later, after having discharged two
successive attorneys and obtaining in propria persona a postponement of the trial on the contest, a voluntary dismissal
was filed. Subsequently, the executor named in the decedent's
20. Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
40 (1934).
1. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §
40 (1934).
§

3. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1969). For further discussion of
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this
volume.

2. 269 Cal. App.2d 656, 665, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 307.
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will filed an action for damages, based on malicious prosecution, for loss of executor's commissions, loss of trustee's fees,
injury to his reputation, and mental anguish.
Generally, a cause of action based on malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to have obtained favorable termination
in a prior proceeding in which he waS a defendant. The Court
divided its comments on these prerequisites into two areas:
being a defendant in a prior proceeding, and a favorable termination. The court said:
"When the will contest was filed, the petitioner became
in one sense a 'defendant' for the purposes of the trial
of the contest. He was a person who was aggrieved by
the conduct of the contestant who had filed the contest for
a spiteful purpose and without probable cause.,,4
The Court went on to say that a favorable termination need
not have been a final determination of the controversy, because voluntary dismissal is a favorable termination even
though it is made "without prejudice." The judgment of the
trial court, awarding the decedent's intended executor the
amount of commissions lost by the appointment of a public
administrator during the pendency of the will contest was
affirmed.
Another estate-related tort case in Heyer v. Flaig,5 involving the negligence of an attorney in drafting a will. The sole
question was the commencement of running of the statute of
limitations against the claim of the testatrix's intended beneficiaries. She had consulted her attorney, Flaig, prior to her
marriage, disclosing her nuptial plans and requesting that a
will be prepared leaving her entire estate to her two daughters.
Flaig, the defendant here, apparently did not advise the testatrix of the consequences of a posttestamentary marriage.
Ten days after the execution of the will prepared for her by
4. 275 Cal. App.2d - , - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. - , cites Probate Code § 371:
"On the trial (of the will contest), the
contestant is plaintiff and the petitioner
is defendant. .

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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449 P.2d 161 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS,
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Flaig, testatrix married. Six months later, she died, and her
recently acquired spouse claimed a portion of her estate. 6
The two daughters, who were the intended beneficiaries,
brought an action against Flaig more than 2 years after the
drafting of the will, but within 2 years from the testatrix's
death. The State Supreme Court held that the attorney drafting the will had a continuing duty to the testatrix to give effect
to her testamentary wishes. The damage caused by his negligence was only potential until the testatrix's death, which
prevented its correction. The Court said:
"Because defendant owed plaintiffs this continuing duty
the cause of action did not accrue nor the statute of
limitations commence to run until the defendant's negligence became irremediable. m
More important, perhaps, are the Court's comments on
the rights of the intended beneficiaries to bring such an action.
The right had been previously established in the earlier
case of Lucas v. Hamm. 8 However, the Court appears to have
enlarged the scope of liability to persons not in privity with one
who, ex delicto, breaches a duty arising out of a contract.
While the rule set forth in Lucas would have been a sufficient
basis to uphold liability here, the Court further cites Connor
v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn.,9 for the proposition that
"liability may flow from relationships which are not expressed by contract between the parties not in 'privity' with
each other . . . .,,10 This thread of logic may be extended
to other areas of the law in the future.
3. Will Contests
In addition to the contest-related tort action of MacDonald v. Joslyn, there were several other will-contest matters

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/12

6. His claim was based on Probate
Code § 70.
7. 70 Cal.2d 225, 230, 74 Cal. Rptr.
225,229,449 P.2d 161, 165 (1969).
8. 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
364 P.2d 685 (1961) cert. den. 368
U.S. 987, 7 L.Ed.2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603.
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9. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369,
447 P.2d 609 (1968).
10. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 228, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 228, 449 P.2d 161, 164
(1969).
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that warrant comment. Estate of Collinsll dealt with the assignment of one's interest in an estate solely for the purpose of
contesting a will. Simply stated, the appellant in Collins
sought out relatives of a testator and obtained assignments so
he could commence will contests. While the right to contest
a will may be assigned by an heir,12 assignments made to heir
hunters are against public policy and therefore void. Because
the validity of an assignment that would enable one to commence a will contest depends on the facts of each individual
case, it is difficult to set forth a universal rule of law. Here,
the Court described that fact as follows:
"
. when a non-lawyer acts for prospective beneficiaries under arrangements providing for his payment
of litigation expenses and the non-lawyer controls the
litigation instituted on behalf of the beneficiaries, such
procedure amounts to commercial exploitation of the
legal profession."13
Therefore, if a will contest is brought by an assignee, one
of the first areas of inquiry on the part of the attorney representing the proponents of the will should be the facts surrounding the assignment. The Collins case holds that it is proper
to determine the validity of the assignment prior to a determination on the merits of the contest.
To successfully contest a will on the ground of undue influence, it must be shown, in addition to the other requisite
factors of confidential relationship and undue benefit, that
the benefitting person actually participated in the preparation
of the will. Estate of Kerner,14 turned on such a point. There,
the deceased had the advice of an attorney who prepared his
will. The attorney's declaration in support of a motion for
summary judgment averred that he was never contacted by
the persons who were alleged to have exerted undue influence
over the testator. The Court said:
11. 268 Cal. App.2d 86, 73 Cal. Rptr.
599 (1968).
12. 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law,
p. 3230 (1960).
CAL LAW 1970
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14. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
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"Accordingly, if the person alleged to have exerted undue
influence has not actively participated in the preparation or execution of the will, undue influence is not established, even though such person may have been in a
confidential relationship with the testator and have unduly profited from the Will."15
No affidavits or declarations having been filed in opposition
to the motion, summary judgment was granted and affirmed
on appeal.
4. Interpretation of Wills
Estate of Becker16 involved a controversy between intestacy
laws and the terms of a will. Subsequent to execution of her
will, the testatrix had purchased nonrefundable annuities. A
suit by the administratrix to recover the purchase price of
the annuities based on the testatrix's incompetency was settled
for $25,000. The question was whether these funds passed
under the terms of the will to a charitable trust or by intestacy.
The will had used the words "all income from my several bank
accounts, also all income derived from all my stocks . . . " in
making the bequest.
Clearly, the fund in controversy did not fall into either
category specified in the will. Therefore, the Court considered whether the words "all income" were words of limitation or words of enlargement. The Court said:

". . . if the words derived from my several bank accounts, also all income derived from my stocks are construed as words of enlargement then the words merely
indicate two sources from which income may be derived
and do not exclude other sources of income. ,,17
The opinion quotes at length from Page On WillS 18 in pointing
out when two inconsistent descriptions are contained within
15. 275 Cal. App.2d - , - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 289, 291.
16. 270 Cal. App.2d 31, 75 Cal. Rptr.
359 (1969).
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17. 270 Cal. App.2d 31, 35, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 359, 361.
18. Page on Wills (New Rev.) §
33.34.
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a will, one general and the other more particular, the court
must give effect to the testator's intent as ascertained from
the entire will. From a latter portion of the will appointing
an executor of "all above properties," the Court concluded
that the testatrix intended to dispose of her entire estate, including those funds acquired after her death. Thus, the afteracquired assets passed under the terms of the will.
5. Instructions to Personal Representative
The right to petition the Court for instructions pursuant to
the Probate Code19 was before the Court in Estate of Webb. 20
The decedent's stepdaughter, a legatee named in the will.
petitioned the Court for instructions to the administrator. The
petition was denied on the basis that only the legal representative of the estate may petition the court for instructions. This
type of relief is not available to one who is merely a legatee.
In Estate of Pratt/ a Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the occupant of estate property to either vacate or post
a bond for the rental value pending a determination of title to
the property. A special administrator had been appointed
pending a determination of multiple contests to several documents, each purporting to be the last will of a deceased who
left no heirs. The ultimate decision of the contests was required to ascertain the distributee of certain real property that
was an asset of the estate. One person, claiming a right to
the property under one of the contested documents, occupied
the property. After a petition for instructions by the special
administrator, the Court ordered the occupant to either vacate
the property or post a bond to secure the payment of the reasonable rental value in the event the occupant was found to
have no right to the property.
The reviewing coure stated that between the special administrator and persons not related to the deceased by blood,
the sole right to possession is in the administrator. The opinion goes on to say that since the Probate Court had no juris19. Probate Code § 88.
20. 269 Cal. App.2d 172, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 710 (1969).
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diction to determine title to the property between the administrator and the claimant, the Court's order exceeded its jurisdiction. A petition for instructions was the proper manner
for the administrator to obtain directions from the Court as
to whether the property should be rented, and if so, the terms
of such rental. Thus armed with such instructions, the administrator could negotiate with the occupant for a suitable
rental agreement. The Court states that failing there, the
administrator's sole remedy would be a plenary action at law
against the occupant, presumably for unlawful detainer.
6. Guardians and Conservators
Only a person interested in the well-being of a conservatee
may object to the termination of a conservatorship, was the
holding in Conservatorship of the Estate of Stewart. 3 The
conservatee, upon recovery from a heart condition that caused
his estate to be placed in a conservatorship, filed his petition
for its termination. Objections were made by parties who
claimed damages for breach of contract. The Court pointed
out that in a conservatorship, title to the estate does not vest in
the conservator. Rather, the conservator acts as an agent for
the conservatee. Whatever rights objectors had against the
estate during the conservatorship continue against the conservatee after his restoration to capacity. The Court's order
discharging the conservator operates only between the two
parties to the conservatorship, that is, the conservator and
conservatee. Because the rights of the creditors or claimants
are preserved, such persons do not have standing to object
to the termination of the conservatorship.
Estate of Ehle 4 held that the attorney for the guardian may
recover attorney's fees from the guardianship without filing
a creditor's claim in the estate of the deceased when a ward
dies leaving an estate to be probated. The attorney, having
commenced a suit based on a denied claim in the estate of
a deceased, subsequently requested fees in the petition and
final accounting in the guardianship. The Court said:
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3. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1969).
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4. 267 Cal. App.2d 24, 72 Cal. Rptr.
474 (1968).
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"Attorneys' fees for services rendered to the guardian on
behalf of the ward and the estate of the guardianship are
proper expenses of the guardian to be paid out of the
guardianship assets, and it is not necessary to file a claim
therefore in the estate of a deceased ward in order to
protect the right to enforce a claim for such services in
the guardianship proceedings. "5
To further secure the payment of a proper expense of the
guardianship, the Court will impose a lien on the estate in the
event the assets have been transferred to an administrator or
executor.
5. 267 Cal. App.2d 24, 29, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 474, 477-478.
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